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Is There a Way Forward in the  
“War over the Family”? 
FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS.  
By Clare Huntington.  New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014.  352 pages.  $45.00. 
Linda C. McClain* 
I. Introduction 
A. Bringing Together Two Conversations About Marriage 
In a recent oral argument before the Seventh Circuit about the 
constitutionality of Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s laws barring marriage by 
same-sex couples and recognition of such marriages, Wisconsin’s assistant 
attorney general defended Wisconsin’s marriage laws as part of a “concerted 
Wisconsin policy to reduce numbers of children born out of wedlock.”1  In 
response, one judge on the panel quipped: “I assume you know how that has 
been working out in practice?”2  In a subsequent acerbic and witty opinion 
unanimously affirming the federal district court rulings invalidating 
Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s restrictive laws, Judge Posner also expressed 
incredulity at the argument that excluding same-sex couples from marriage 
cohered with the states’ interest in “channeling procreative sex into 
(necessarily heterosexual) marriage” to address “the problem of ‘accidental 
births’” and “unintended” and “unwanted children.”3  If that channeling 
policy were succeeding, he reasoned, “we would expect a drop in the 
percentage of children born to an unmarried woman, or at least not an 
 
 *   Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  
I am grateful to June Carbone for constructive comments on an earlier draft and to David 
Blankenhorn, Lynn Mather, and Andrew Schepard for instructive conversation about the issues 
addressed in this Review and for bibliographical suggestions.  I presented an earlier draft at the 
workshop, Theorizing the State: The Resources of Vulnerability, held at Emory University School 
of Law, and received valuable comments from participants, including Clare Huntington.  Thanks 
also to Stefanie Weigmann, Assistant Director for Research, Faculty Assistance, and Technology, 
Pappas Law Library, for valuable research assistance.  A Boston University summer research grant 
supported this work. 
1. Associated Press, Judges Take Tough Tone at Gay Marriage Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/us/judges-take-tough-tone-at-gay-marriage-hearing.ht 
ml?_r=1, archived at http://perma.cc/9QXR-2RKZ.  The oral argument is available at: http://media 
.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/rt.2.14-2526_08_26_2014.mp3, archived at http://perma.cc/QT7H-
REQG. 
2. Associated Press, supra note 1. 
3. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2583880 
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increase” since Indiana and Wisconsin adopted their restrictive laws.4  
Instead, each state—similar to “the nation as a whole”—has experienced 
about a 10% increase from 1997 to 2012, with over 40% of births to 
unmarried women.5  Thus, “there is no indication” that the states’ marriage 
laws have had any “channeling” effect.6 
One effect those laws have had, Posner observed, in seeming conflict 
with the states’ “concern” with accidental or unplanned births and “unwanted 
children,” is to bar from marriage the “homosexual couples” who are far more 
likely than heterosexual couples to adopt those children.7  Indeed, ignoring 
adoption was an “extraordinary oversight” in the states’ argument.8  If 
marriage between a child’s parents “enhances the child’s prospects for a 
happy and successful life,”9 such that “marriage is better for children who are 
being brought up by their biological parents, [then] it must be better for 
children who are being brought up by their adoptive parents.”10  “The state 
should want homosexual couples who adopt children,” as state law permits 
them to do, “to be married.”11  Children, “natural conformists” and “upset” 
by being out of step “with their peers,” would thereby experience “emotional 
comfort” and security.12  United States v. Windsor’s13 child-focused 
“criticisms” of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Posner argued, apply 
even more forcefully to the complete denial of marriage to same-sex couples: 
“The differentiation . . . humiliates tens of thousands of children now being 
raised by same-sex couples . . . [and] makes it even more difficult for the 
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”14  
Challenges to restrictive marriage laws, Posner concludes, while “[f]ormally” 
about discrimination, are, “at a deeper level, . . . about the welfare of 
American children.”15 
 
4. Id. at 664. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 654, 662–63. 
8. Id. at 662. 
9. Id. at 663. 
10. Id. at 664. 
11. Id.  Judge Posner’s emphasis on adoption of “unwanted” children, while strategically 
effective, does not acknowledge other pathways to parenthood pursued by same-sex couples, such 
as the use of assisted reproductive technology and second parent adoption of one partner’s biological 
child.  Stu Marvel, The Surprising Resilience of the Traditional Family 7–9 (Dec. 10, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
12. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663–64. 
13. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
14. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 659 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
15. Id. at 654. 
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The Seventh Circuit oral argument and opinion bring together and 
illuminate two conversations about marriage, family law, and equality that 
too often proceed independently.  In the first, in the numerous post-Windsor 
challenges to restrictive marriage laws taking place in courtrooms across the 
country, same-sex couples and the courts who rule in their favor emphasize 
the high stakes of exclusion by characterizing marriage as a highly esteemed, 
incomparable institution and a status that signals one’s intimate commitment 
is worthy of equal respect and dignity.16  Defenders of restrictive marriage 
laws narrow marriage’s role to channeling otherwise irresponsible 
heterosexuals into a stable family form for the sake of the children their 
unions may produce.17  That rationale puts same-sex couples—who cannot 
become parents by accident—beyond the concerns of the state, which “has 
no interest in ‘licensing adults’ love.”18  Even this channeling argument, 
however, gives marriage an unrivaled role as the social institution designed 
to address a fundamental social problem and to anchor parental investment 
in children.19  Judge Posner’s opinion illustrates the twofold rejoinder to that 
argument: (1) this reductive view of marriage ignores the actual content of 
state marriage laws, which indicate that “[t]he state must think marriage 
valuable for something other than just procreation,” and (2) if the state 
regards marriage as the optimal family form for child rearing, then allowing 
same-sex couples to marry advances marriage’s child-protective functions 
and spares children humiliation and tangible deprivations.20  To be left out of 
marriage is to experience a second class form of family life and (as another 
federal appellate court put it) to be “prohibit[ed] . . . from participating fully 
in our society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot countenance.”21 
Parallel to this exaltation of marriage in rulings that bring more families 
under marriage’s protective umbrella is a second discourse about the 
 
16. Windsor provides a template for this.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (stating that DOMA 
interferes with “the equal dignity of same-sex marriages” conferred by New York’s law); id. at 2692 
(describing how marriage by a same-sex couple is a “relationship deemed by the State worthy of 
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages”). 
17. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing and rejecting 
“Proponents’ attempts to differentiate same-sex couples from other couples who cannot procreate 
accidentally”); supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
18. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 394 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Virginia’s argument). 
19. In his influential account, Carl Schneider proposed: “[I]n the channelling function the law 
creates or (more often) supports social institutions [such as marriage and parenthood] which are 
thought to serve desirable ends.”  Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 498 (1992); see also Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby 
Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2135–
37 (2007) (considering the continuing relevance of the channeling function in litigation over same-
sex marriage and in challenges to “the conventional sequences of love, marriage, and the baby 
carriage”). 
20. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 659, 662. 
21. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384. 
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disappearance of marriage from the lives of a growing number of people and 
communities in the United States.22  “[T]he share of American adults who 
have never been married is at an historic high,” while the “shares of adults 
cohabiting and raising children outside of marriage have increased 
significantly.”23  Too many young adults, policy analysts warn, are “drifting” 
into sex and parenthood unintentionally and outside of marriage.24  Reports 
of a growing class-, race-, and gender-based marriage divide stress the 
urgency of this “other marriage equality problem.”25  This discourse also 
warns of the “diverging destinies” of children born into or reared in marital 
versus nonmarital families26 and of the “reproduction of inequalities” as these 
patterns continue across generations. 27  Policy analysts debate whether it is 
possible to close the marriage gap or whether changes in economic 
conditions, values (or social norms), and gender patterns are such that a more 
realistic policy is to move “beyond marriage” and to aim instead at cultivating 
a “new ethic of responsible parenthood.”28 
The Seventh Circuit opinion brings together these two pieces of the 
marriage puzzle by examining the incentive effects, or influence, of state 
laws on patterns of family life.  It also invites holistic consideration of 
whether a state’s family laws cohere as a whole and achieve the aims of 
securing “the welfare of American children.”29  That the state laws at issue 
were those of Indiana and Wisconsin serendipitously introduces the 
 
22. See generally NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT & CTR. FOR MARRIAGE & FAMILIES, THE STATE 
OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2010: WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW MIDDLE 
AMERICA (2010); PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 
(2010). 
23. WENDY WANG & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., RECORD SHARE OF AMERICANS 
HAVE NEVER MARRIED: AS VALUES, ECONOMICS AND GENDER PATTERNS CHANGE 4 (2014), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-24_Never-Married-Ameri 
cans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H4SD-U2GT. 
24. Isabel V. Sawhill, Opinion, Beyond Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, http://nytimes 
.com/2014/09/14/opinion/sunday/beyond-marriage.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/RF8B-
FJY7 [hereinafter Sawhill, Beyond Marriage].  See generally ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION 
UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE (2014) [hereinafter 
SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND]. 
25. For this coinage, see Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 921, 924 (2013). 
26. See Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second 
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 611, 614 (2004) (arguing that differences in the 
childbirth trajectories of the least- and most-educated women are leading to children of single 
mothers losing resources, while children born to more affluent (usually married) women are gaining 
resources). 
27. See Sara McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction of 
Inequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257, 271 (2008) (“[T]he evidence suggests that recent changes in 
the family are contributing to the intergenerational persistence of inequality.”). 
28. Sawhill, Beyond Marriage, supra note 24; see also WANG & PARKER, supra note 23, at 4–
5 (attributing the rising share of never married to changes in values, economics, and gender 
patterns). 
29. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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relevance of “welfare” to child welfare and family law: Zablocki v. Redhail,30 
in which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Wisconsin’s efforts to 
encourage responsible fatherhood by linking access to marriage to paying 
child support and keeping one’s children off welfare,31 is a cornerstone in 
arguments in marriage equality litigation that the “fundamental” right to 
marry is “expansive” and “broad” rather than narrow.32  In the 1990s, Tommy 
Thompson, Governor of Wisconsin, was a poster child for experimenting 
with welfare reform to encourage “individual responsibility.”33  Indiana is the 
home state of former Vice President Dan Quayle, an iconic figure in the 
1990s welfare debates who linked intergenerational poverty to a “poverty of 
values”34 and invited endless commentary on whether he was “right” or 
“wrong” for criticizing television character Murphy Brown’s decision to 
have a nonmarital child as setting a bad example for young women to create 
fatherless families.35 
In Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family Relationships, 
family law scholar Clare Huntington issues a similar invitation to assess 
holistically the impact of family law on families and, particularly, on 
children.  That inventory, she argues, yields dismal conclusions about the 
law’s failure to foster “family well-being” and “strengthen family 
relationships.”36  Huntington indicts both “dispute-resolution family law”—
that is, the “legal rules governing divorce, paternity, child abuse, and other 
 
30. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
31. Id. at 388–91. 
32. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *12 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 7, 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Zablocki as rejecting a “narrow” right to marry, 
such as “the right of fathers with unpaid child support obligations to marry”); Bostic v. Schaefer, 
760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Zablocki to support a “broad right to marry that is not 
circumscribed based on the characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that right”). 
33. See States’ Perspective on Welfare Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 104th 
Cong. 18 (1995) (statement of Hon. Tommy G. Thompson, Governor of the State of Wisconsin) 
(characterizing welfare reform in Wisconsin as “demand[ing] individual responsibility from welfare 
recipients”).  President George W. Bush subsequently appointed Thompson Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Former Wisconsin Governor Tommy G. Thompson Becomes New Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (Feb. 2, 2001), available at http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010202.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JF6A-9HJV. 
34. Vice President Dan Quayle, Speech on Cities and Poverty at the Commonwealth Club of 
California (May 19, 1992), in N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/1992/05/20/us/after-the-riots-excerpts-from-vice-president-s-speech-on-cities-and-poverty.ht 
ml, archived at http://perma.cc/9ETU-TUCD. 
35. Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle Says Riots Sprang from Lack of Family Values, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 1992, at A1, A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/20/us/after-the-riots-
excerpts-from-vice-president-s-speech-on-cities-and-poverty.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M6 
HK-U4VG.  For an example of commentary, see generally Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle 
Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 1993, at 47, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/maga 
zine/archive/1993/04/dan-quayle-was-right/307015/, archived at http://perma.cc/DR3X-5TT2.  
36. CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS xiii (2014). 
MCCLAIN.TOPRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:04 PM 
710 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:705 
kinds of family conflicts”37—and “structural family law,”38 within which she 
includes not only the conventional subject matter of family law—such as 
rules about marriage and parenthood—but also the many forms of legal 
regulation that “influence[] the context for relationships”—such as zoning 
laws, employment discrimination laws, and criminal laws.39  “[C]ontext 
matters,” Huntington argues, because “relationships do not exist in a 
vacuum.”40  Huntington challenges readers to think holistically and broadly 
about the role of law in shaping family life. 
Huntington enlists positive psychology to explain why relationships 
matter to individuals and society and under what circumstances such 
relationships develop.41  Thus, the normative vision that should guide family 
law is “that family law in all of its aspects should nurture strong, stable, 
positive relationships.”42  She contends that, while a “few narrow reforms” 
are moving family toward that vision, they will remain “haphazard, 
unconnected, and sometimes actively challenged” without the “overarching 
theory of family law” that she proposes to unite them “and encourage more 
complete change.”43 
B. A Propitious Juncture in the “War over the Family”? 
Failure to Flourish arrives at a peculiar, and perhaps propitious, 
juncture in long-running public conversations about the relationship among 
family life, family values, and family law when it is possible to ask about a 
way forward to end the “war over the family.”44  For decades, a disturbing 
contradiction or paradox in state and federal family law and policy was that, 
even as government sought to shore up marriage and “responsible 
fatherhood” to address the “failure of families to form” (single-parent 
families) and the rise in “broken families” (due to divorce), it excluded same-
sex couples from marriage to “defend” marriage and often hindered lesbians 
and gay men and their children from forming legally protected families.45  
That legal landscape is rapidly, although not uniformly, changing to welcome 
same-sex couples into the marriage fold.  Yet, as the Seventh Circuit 
opinion’s appeal to demographic trends made clear, governments have not 
 
37. Id. at xi. 
38. Id. at xii. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at xi. 
41. Id. at 6–11. 
42. Id. at xvii. 
43. Id. at xvi–xvii. 
44. For more on this formulation, see generally BRIGETTE BERGER & PETER L. BERGER, THE 
WAR OVER THE FAMILY (1983); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 121–30 (1991); DAVID POPENOE, WAR OVER THE FAMILY (2005). 
45. On this paradox, see Linda C. McClain, Federal Family Policy and Family Values from 
Clinton to Obama, 1992–2012 and Beyond, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1621, 1624–25. 
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managed to halt or reverse those trends and bring everyone into the big 
marriage tent.  
Sawhill proposes the terms “traditionalists” and “village builders” to 
capture a basic divide about how best to respond to the separation of marriage 
and parenthood and whether to try to bring everyone into that tent.46  
“Traditionalists” generally “share a deep concern about the fragmentation of 
the family and its implications for adults and especially for children” and, 
thus, view strengthening marriage and restoring a norm of childbearing and 
parenting within marriage as the best way forward.47  They include many 
conservatives who believe that “government does more harm than good” and 
that its programs often undermine marriage and parental responsibility.48  
“Village builders” focus less on family form than on the basic proposition 
that “families exist within a larger society that must take some responsibility 
for helping parents to raise their children;” they insist that “[w]ithout the right 
supports from the larger community, . . . families”—particularly single-
parent families—“will not flourish.”49 
Where does Failure to Flourish position itself in this shifting landscape?  
Is Huntington more of a traditionalist or village builder?  Like Judge Posner, 
Huntington invokes child well-being to condemn legal barriers to marriage 
for same-sex couples who wish to marry.50  Like the attorneys defending 
Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s marriage laws, and like the traditionalists Sawhill 
describes, she also insists that family form matters for children, observing: 
“There is overwhelming evidence that children raised by single or cohabiting 
parents have worse outcomes than children raised by married, biological 
parents.”51  Unlike them, she pulls back from championing marriage as the 
necessary or sole solution to the problem of anchoring parental commitment 
and cooperation in childrearing.52  Instead, a “flourishing family law” should 
support a broad range of families and aim not at marriage, as such, but at 
stable and committed relationships between coparents, so that they “can meet 
the needs of their children.”53  Huntington, thus, is emphatically a “village 
builder” as she details the many ways that the state should support families.54 
 
46. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND, supra note 24, at 7, 83–84. 
47. Id. at 84–85. 
48. Id. at 84. 
49. Id. at 87.  As an example of a village builder, Sawhill cites to Hillary Clinton’s It Takes a 
Village, discussed infra at note 67. 
50. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 171–73. 
51. Id. at 31. 
52. See, e.g., id. at 176 (“[T]he goal is not necessarily to increase the number of marriages but 
rather to increase the long-term commitment between parents, whatever the form.”). 
53. Id. at 179–80. 
54. For an informative exchange between Huntington and the author relating Failure to 
Flourish to Sawhill’s categories, compare Linda C. McClain, On “Traditionalists,” “Village 
Builders,” and the Future of Children, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 1, 2014, 5:36 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/on-traditionalists-village-builders-and.html, archived at 
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In this Review, I will explore whether Failure to Flourish offers a viable 
way forward beyond the “war over the family” by offering a new baseline for 
conversation.  I will also argue that, while Failure to Flourish persuasively 
insists that “context matters,” it is surprisingly acontexual in ways that limit 
its ambitious effort to guide family law.  Failure to Flourish is, at times, 
admirably fine grained, using portraits of particular families to illustrate how 
family law shapes their lives and describing specific initiatives as harbingers 
of a flourishing family law.55  On the other hand, the book articulates a 
normative vision of the “pervasive state” fostering “strong, stable and 
positive relationships” without considering the context of decades of calls by 
various social movements to “strengthen families” and state and federal 
policies aimed at doing so.  It gestures toward an ecological approach to 
families and family law, even calling for a relationship impact statement by 
analogy to an environmental impact statement when considering law and 
policy, without situating that call in the context of decades of calls for a shift 
from family policy to family ecology.56  The book cautions that government 
cannot do it all, gesturing toward the vital role of neighborhoods, religious 
organizations, and other nongovernmental actors but does not engage with 
the significant turn in recent decades to enlist civil society and public–private 
partnerships to help families and address problems government alone can’t 
solve.  Readers could better appreciate and evaluate Huntington’s vision of a 
pervasive state properly directed in aid of human flourishing if they had a 
better sense of how she situates her own project in the context of these 
numerous other ones.  At this point in the family law–family values conver-
sation, there is no clean slate on which to write.  Context, indeed, matters. 
This Review will also argue that Failure to Flourish’s critique of 
dispute-resolution family law as negative, adversarial, and destructive of 
family relationships is acontexual.  With respect to divorce and family 
dissolution, for example, prominent trends—or even revolutions—in family 
law in the direction Huntington favors date back twenty years or more.  
Huntington does not explain why she regards as “islands in a sea of 
dysfunction”57 reforms in this area that other family law scholars identify as 
institutionalized enough to represent a paradigm shift from an adversary 
model of warring attorneys and parents to a problem-solving model aimed at 
 
http://perma.cc/9RZP-DY5L, with Clare Huntington, Tempered Support for a Cultural Change 
Agenda, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 3, 2014, 10:12 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/tempered-
support-for-cultural-change.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C5FF-SEA8. 
55. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 55–58 (sketching portraits of three families to illustrate 
how “the state is present in the lives of all families”); id. at 165–85 (offering examples of how to 
implement a “flourishing family law”). 
56. For discussion, see infra Part III. 
57. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 108. 
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facilitating coparenting and reducing parental conflict.58  As it were, this shift 
aims at a way forward not in the war over the family, but in handling 
acrimony and conflict between family members in a way more conducive to 
peaceful coparenting and child well-being.59  The impulse to call for sweep-
ing away a harmful paradigm to make way for a better one is understandable 
but somewhat misdirected and unnecessary.  If family law, in significant 
ways, has shifted in the direction Huntington advocates, then it might be more 
fruitful to focus on how better to instantiate that positive vision and what 
obstacles may hinder its realization.  Indeed, whether or not Failure to 
Flourish presents an accurate diagnosis, many of its prescriptions are 
appealing and could be pushed even further.  The book is more useful, I will 
suggest, in describing the foundation of a new system, already in place, that 
should be extended than in its description of the current system as mired in 
the past. 
In Part II, I explicate some features of Huntington’s argument and 
highlight valuable contributions the book makes.  In Part III, I will attempt 
to situate Huntington’s diagnosis of the state of the family and her call to 
action in the context of certain developments in the “war over the family.”  I 
will ask whether her prescriptive vision goes far enough.  In Part IV, I will 
argue that her critique of dispute-resolution family law is too negative and 
will try to situate her call for flourishing family law in the context of well-
established trends in family law. 
II. From Negative to Flourishing Family Law 
Families matter—or, as Huntington puts it, “relationships matter”—to 
the individuals in them as well as to society.60  The prominent rhetorical place 
given to families in every presidential campaign amply demonstrates the 
common premise that (as I have written elsewhere) “a significant link exists 
between the state of families and the state of the nation, and that strong, 
healthy families undergird a strong nation,” while “the weakening of families 
both reflects and leads to moral and civic decline and imposes significant 
 
58. See infra Part IV.  To be clear: in this Review I am focusing primarily on dispute-resolution 
law concerning family dissolution, that is, divorce and post-dissolution rules concerning 
coparenting. I am not evaluating Huntington’s diagnosis of dispute-resolution family law in the 
context of child welfare or adoption and surrogacy proceedings.  For a review focused on the child 
welfare context, see generally Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
Apr. 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2519722, archived at http://perma.cc/EM2U-
5A8F. 
59. My inspiration for this imagery is Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.: A Preliminary 
Report and a Model Statute on an Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and 
Separating Parents, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131 (1993). 
60. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 6–7 (describing the correlation between close 
interpersonal relationships and individual well-being). 
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costs on society.”61  Thus, when Huntington, after inventorying the 
challenges facing different types of American families, concludes “[t]he state 
of the American family is not good,”62 she joins a sizeable roster of observers 
from across the political spectrum and across the decades who have sounded 
the alarm about American families in crisis and the implications of that crisis 
for the social and political order.63  Huntington justifies her primary focus on 
“the family relationships that affect and involve children” because it is for 
children (particularly young children) that family relationships are so 
influential.64  When she contends that “[t]he problem facing society . . . is 
that too often families are unable to provide children with the kinds of 
relationships that are essential for healthy development and in turn create 
engaged, productive citizens,”65 she echoes arguments made by family law 
scholars and social movements that stress the formative role played by 
families in fostering the capacity of children for “responsible democratic and 
personal self-government.”66  Reminiscent of Hillary Rodham Clinton, 
Huntington invokes the proverb “[i]t takes a village to raise a child,” arguing 
that families depend upon neighborhoods, communities, workplaces, and the 
state in order to flourish.67 
A distinctive feature of Huntington’s call to action on behalf of families 
is her enlisting of the insights of positive psychology.  Children need “strong 
and stable relationships,” as the literature on human attachment teaches.68  
They also need “positive” relationships that are not abusive and in which the 
parent is “responsive” to the child’s needs “much of the time.”69  Adults, too, 
she argues, need strong, stable, and positive relationships, and a critical 
element of child well-being is that coparents have such a relationship.70   
To support “strong” relationships, family law should grant legal 
recognition to a “broader range of families” than the traditional nuclear 
family, such as same-sex couples who seek to marry and families formed 
through assisted reproductive technology.71  Huntington continues: 
 
61. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2006). 
62. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 54. 
63. See generally MCCLAIN, supra note 61 (surveying the concerns regarding the weakening 
of families in the civil society revival movement, the marriage movement, and the welfare reform 
debates). 
64. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xvi. 
65. Id. at 1. 
66. MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 15–17. 
67. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 158; see also HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A 
VILLAGE (10th anniversary ed. 2006). 
68. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 18. 
69. Id. at 20. 
70. Id. at 20–21. 
71. Id. at xv. 
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To foster stable relationships, structural family law should encourage 
long-term commitment between parents—commitment to each other 
or at least commitment to the shared work of raising children.  To 
foster positive relationships, structural family law should make subtle 
but crucial changes to the context in which families live . . . [to] 
increase family interaction and build social ties between families and 
the larger community.72 
Huntington proposes that family law be informed by appreciation of 
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein’s idea of the “cycle of intimacy,” which people 
experience “repeatedly” in their lifetimes:73 
A widespread human experience is that individuals experience love, 
inevitably transgress against those they love, feel guilt about the 
transgression, and then seek to repair the damage.  Individuals 
experience this cycle repeatedly throughout their lifetimes, with 
transgressions ranging from the minor, such as parents raising their 
voices to their children, to the more egregious, such as an individual 
undermining a marriage.  In healthy parent-child and adult 
relationships, a person is able to acknowledge the transgression and 
then seeks to repair the damage.74 
Measured by that framework, family law, “[w]ith a few exceptions, . . . 
is fundamentally negative.”75  Instead of helping with the work of repair, 
dispute-resolution family law focuses on “rupture without repair.”76  Custody 
battles are zero sum and fail to help parents repair their relationship so they 
can successfully coparent after the legal divorce.77 
Structural family law, the numerous ways in which law structures family 
life, takes a “largely reactive stance toward family well-being, expecting 
families to build [strong, stable, positive] relationships on their own” and 
then “wait[ing] for a crisis and then interven[ing] in a heavy-handed 
manner.”78 
Huntington acknowledges “narrow reforms” to structural and dispute-
resolution family law in the direction she recommends.79  She contends, 
however, that these “are best understood as islands in a sea of dysfunction.”80  
A “basic reorientation” and new vision are in order: a “flourishing” family 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 21, 235 n.138. 
74. Id. at 21. 
75. Id. at 108. 
76. Id. at 83. 
77. Id. at 88–91. 
78. Id. at 92–93.  As noted above, I will focus on Huntington’s critique of the family dissolution 
aspect of dispute-resolution family law rather than the child welfare, abuse and neglect, and other 
aspects. 
79. Id. at 106. 
80. Id. at 108. 
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law “should strive to foster strong, stable, positive relationships from the 
beginning.”81  This entails “changing . . . the way the state resolves the 
inevitable conflicts that mark family life”—dispute-resolution family law—
and changing “the broader structural relationship between families and the 
state”—structural family law.82 
Failure to Flourish deserves praise for urging a broader conception of 
family law that includes the numerous ways the state influences families and 
family life.  That broader definition, Huntington argues, is “essential if we 
want to think more creatively about how the state can nurture strong, stable, 
positive relationships.”83  A related valuable feature of Failure to Flourish: 
the idea of the pervasive state, which reaches the family not only through 
“direct regulation,” but also “influences families indirectly through 
incentives and subsidies, ‘choice architecture,’ myriad laws and policies 
seemingly unrelated to the family, and by shaping social norms.”84  
Perceiving that “state regulation of family life is deep and broad,”85 
Huntington argues, is “essential for rethinking how the state should influence 
families.”86  Thus, the fruitful debate is not whether or not the state is 
pervasive or that it is acting; instead, “[t]he goal is to figure out how best to 
redirect this pervasive state so that it encourages strong, stable, positive 
relationships within the family.”87  These insights about the pervasive state 
are a useful addition to a significant body of theoretical work by family law 
scholars on the state, including, for example, Maxine Eichner’s argument for 
a “supportive state” and Martha Fineman’s theory of the “responsive state.”88 
III. Enlisting the State to Encourage Strong Family Relationships: Some 
Context 
If the public policy debates and initiatives of the last several decades 
yield any lessons, one might be to ponder whether and how the pervasive 
state can nurture or encourage strong, stable, and positive relationships.  
 
81. Id. at 109. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 58. 
84. Id. at 63. 
85. Id. at 58. 
86. Id. at 68. 
87. Id. at 80. 
88. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND 
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 4–9 (2010) (developing a liberal democratic “normative account of 
the family-state relationship” that amends liberalism to “recognize the dependency of the human 
condition” and the role of the state in “supporting caretaking and human developments . . . so that 
citizens can lead full, dignified lives, both individually and collectively”); Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 262–63, 273–75 
(2010) (critiquing the universal and autonomous “liberal subject” and liberal conceptions of 
autonomy and arguing for grounding conception of a “responsive” state and of how societal 
institutions allocate resources around the “vulnerable subject”). 
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Given the pervasive theme of “strengthening families” in several social 
movements and developments in law and policy, it would be instructive to 
know what Huntington thinks these efforts got right or wrong, and what 
lessons, if any, we might glean from these earlier and ongoing initatives about 
family flourishing.  Is the failure to promote flourishing families a failure of 
vision or of implementing the vision? 
A. Is It Finally Time for a Shift from “Family Policy” to “Family 
Ecology”? 
An attractive feature of Huntington’s normative vision is its interest in 
the social environments that allow children to flourish and also, in the face 
of adversity, to be resilient.  She uses imagery of a “web of care” that 
“provides critical support for parents in their caregiving responsibilities” and 
cautions that “too often the web is frayed by environments that do not help 
neighbors build social connections.”89  Another attractive feature is her 
recognition that government can’t do it all and that institutions of civil society 
play an important part.90  “The saying ‘[i]t takes a village to raise a child’ is 
shopworn,” she concedes, “but the basic idea is sound.”91 
Readers may have a sharp sense of déjà vu with respect to this appeal to 
an ecological model and the need to enlist civil society and “the village” to 
help families.  For example, in 1991, family law scholar Mary Ann Glendon 
proposed “a shift from family policy to family ecology.”92  She asked whether 
it was possible to move from “the war over the family”—between the 
“cultural right” and “cultural left”93—toward a “sensible American family 
policy” that would put “children at the center” in recognition of “the high 
public interest in the nurture and education of citizens.”94  Glendon frequently 
used imagery of “fraying” social networks and environment to highlight the 
urgent need to take an ecological perspective.95 
Enlisting Urie Bronfenbrenner’s work on the ecology of human 
development, she urged that public deliberation about families should focus 
on “interconnected environments” and how “[j]ust as individual identity and 
well-being are influenced by conditions within families, families themselves 
 
89. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 158. 
90. See id. at 146–49 (examining the mutual dependency of the state and families in 
successfully achieving the essential work of raising children). 
91. Id. at 158. 
92. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
130 (1991) (emphasis omitted). 
93. See id. at 121 (exploring the political battle over family policy between the  “cultural right,” 
which defends and imagines, as the “basic social unit,” the “traditional” family based on marriage 
between a husband–breadwinner and wife–homemaker, and the “cultural left,” which rejects the 
traditional family as patriarchal and oppressive and instead views the individual as the basic social 
unit and speaks more of “families” as including nontraditional forms of family). 
94. Id. at 126. 
95. E.g., id. at 135. 
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are sensitive to conditions within surrounding networks of groups—
neighborhoods, workplaces, churches, schools, and other associations.”96  
Glendon urged that taking this “more comprehensive view” would be a 
helpful way to move beyond a “verbal war over the family to . . . reasoning 
together about conditions of family life.”97  As does Huntington, Glendon 
stresses the important implications for an ecological approach of the famous 
thirty-year study of nearly 700 infants born in the Hawaiian state of Kauai,98 
one-third of which were “classified as high-risk because of exposure to 
perinatal stress and other factors such as poverty, low parental education, an 
alcoholic or mentally ill parent, or divorce.”99  As Huntington reports, 
“[d]espite these life circumstances, a third of the children in the high-risk 
category developed into competent, caring adults” and the “distinguishing 
factor” for those better outcomes was that the children “had emotional 
support from extended family, neighbors, teachers, or church groups, and 
they had at least one close friend.”100  For Glendon: 
[T]he Kauai study challenges us to reflect on the relative absence of 
public deliberation concerning the state of the social structures within 
which we learn the liberal virtues and practice the skills of 
government; . . . [and] the diverse groups that share with families the 
task of nurturing, educating and inspiring the next generation.101 
Other family law scholars, notably Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, have 
developed a child-centered ecological approach to family and child welfare 
law.102  I focus on Glendon because her environmental or ecological approach 
subsequently shaped two social movements in which she participated: the 
 
96. Id. at 130. 
97. Id. 
98. See id. at 130–33 (emphasizing that the study’s conclusions about what helped children 
overcome adversity show “the importance of keeping . . . interacting social subsystems in view”  in 
public deliberations about the family). 
99. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 12. 
100. Id.  Thus, Huntington praises the efforts of a reformer deeply influenced by Urie 
Bronfenbrenner’s idea of “human ecology and the networks that form among parents and others 
who care for children.”  Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101. GLENDON, supra note 92, at 134. 
102. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: 
Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 817, 818–19 (2009) (linking the well-
being of children with other vulnerable groups and arguing that by providing for the needs of 
children and their caregivers, all will benefit). 
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“responsive communitarian” movement, launched in 1991,103 and the civil 
society revival movement of the late 1990s.104 
Like Huntington, these movements worried about the well-being of 
children and argued that family form matters for parents engaging in, as 
Huntington puts it, their “critical child-development work.”105  Although the 
civil society movement did not speak precisely of strong, stable, and positive 
relationships, it stressed the formative role of families in teaching basic 
qualities important for relationships and for citizenship.106  Noting the risks 
of a weakened social ecology, civil society movement leaders urged: “As a 
nation, we must commit ourselves to the proposition that every child should 
be raised in an intact two-parent family, whenever possible, and by one caring 
and competent adult at the very least.”107  The marriage movement 
emphasized better (on average) child outcomes as well as the better social 
health of married adults as reasons why all levels of government should 
“[m]ake supporting and promoting marriage an explicit goal of domestic 
policy.”108 
To be sure, Huntington would quickly distance her own position from 
at least some aspects of these family- and child-focused social movements, 
noting that flourishing family law’s goal of fostering stable, strong, and 
positive relationships between coparents and parents and children does not 
equate simply to promoting marriage.109  Fair enough.  My point is that 
Huntington’s implicit embrace of an ecological approach to family 
 
103. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and 
Responsibilities, in THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 251 (1993) [hereinafter Communitarian Platform] 
(outlining the Communitarian perspective on the family, education, communities, and the polity and 
identifying Mary Ann Glendon as a coauthor of the platform issued on November 18, 1991). 
104. See generally COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC’Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY 
NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS 6 (1998) [hereinafter A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY] (describing “civil society” 
as the best “conceptual framework” for “the moral renewal” of democracy). 
105. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 159–63; see also Communitarian Platform, supra note 
103, at 257 (“[T]he weight of the historical, sociological, and psychological evidence suggests that 
on average two-parent families are better able to discharge their child-raising duties if only because 
there are more hands—and voices—available for the task.”). 
106. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 104, at 7. 
107. NAT’L COMM’N ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: HOW CIVIC 
DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 13 (1998). 
108. INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 10, 
22 (2000) [hereinafter THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT], available at http://americanvalues.org/cata 
log/pdfs/marriagemovement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5KQ8-NMRV. 
109. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 176–80.  I have engaged critically elsewhere with all three 
of these movements.  See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 20–48 (2013) (challenging dichotomous treatment of rights and 
responsibilities in the responsive communitarian movement); id. at 93–106 (posing questions about 
several core tenets of the civil society revival movement); MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 62, 75 
(critiquing the civil society movement for its inattention to inequality within the family and its 
ambivalence about sex equality); id. at 118–54 (critiquing the marriage movement and 
governmental marriage promotion for inattention to the relationship between marriage quality and 
sex equality and failing to embrace sex equality as a component of “healthy marriage”). 
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flourishing has some striking antecedents.  Does she see any connection 
between her vision and these prior prescriptions?  Further, to the extent that 
those earlier proposals influenced concrete family policy—for example, calls 
for marriage education and promotion, responsible fatherhood initiatives, and 
divorce reform—what, if anything, might we learn about successes or failures 
of a “pervasive state” at fostering relationships? 
B. “Putting the Brakes on” Divorce: Why Not Do More to Encourage 
Reconciliation? 
If family law, as Huntington urges, should do more to repair 
relationships, then the tantalizing question arises: do earlier proposals to do 
more to save marriages warrant reconsideration?  Over two decades ago, 
political philosopher and presidential advisor William Galston (prominent in 
the communitarian, civil society, and marriage movements) argued that given 
the effects of divorce on children, “it would be reasonable to introduce 
‘braking’ mechanisms that require parents contemplating divorce to pause 
for reflection.”110  Even if that “pause for reflection” did not “succeed in 
warding off divorce,” it afforded time for the couple to “resolv[e] crucial 
details of the divorce,”111 with their “first obligation to decide the future of 
their children before settling questions of property and maintenance.”112  
Further, “[b]y encouraging parents to look at the consequences of a family 
breakup rather than at the alleged cause or excuse for it,” the hope is that 
“couples will improve their prospects of saving the marriage.”113 
Perhaps a family law focused on repair should do more to save 
marriages for the sake of the children.  On the one hand, Huntington resists 
this, characterizing the requirement in some states that courts “attempt to 
reconcile a couple filing for divorce” as a “superficial attempt to ‘repair’ the 
relationship.”114  She reasons that “[b]y the time one person in the couple has 
initiated divorce proceedings, the time for reconciliation is typically over,” 
so that “[t]he real focus for the repair should be on the future relationship of 
the couple as coparents.”115  On the other hand, in the following passage she 
ponders what the state might do when “[i]t may be in a child’s interests for 
 
110. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE 
LIBERAL STATE 286 (1991). 
111. Id. at 286–87 (quoting Marilyn Gardner, Putting Children First—The New English 
Precedent, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 1990, at 14, available at http://www.csmonitor 
.com/1990/0330/pgar30.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JWC8-EHFY) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
112. Id. at 286. 
113. Id. (quoting Gardner, supra note 111) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 117–18. 
115. Id. at 118. 
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the mother and father to stay together . . . but not necessarily in the parents’ 
interests”:116 
Setting aside a case of domestic violence, where separation makes 
good sense, commitment between adults is one of the situations 
where family law should first try to align the interests of the family 
by encouraging the parents to develop a stronger relationship with 
each other.  But in the absence of that, family law should still 
prioritize the child’s needs.  “Staying together for the sake of the 
children” may seem outdated, but given the alternatives for the 
child, there is something to this intuition.  This is not to say that the 
state should require couples to stay together or make it particularly 
difficult for them to exit a relationship, but there are more indirect 
ways for the state to encourage long-term commitment . . . .117 
Family law students, in my experience, typically react with disbelief to 
the argument that, from the perspective of child outcomes, it is better in a 
low-conflict marriage that parents do not divorce and that it may even be 
better, eventually, for adults.118  Surely, they argue, children will sense if their 
parents are unhappy!  What kind of an example will such parents set for 
forming healthy adult relationships?  Nonetheless, if family law should 
encourage long-term adult commitment, including postdissolution, so that 
children benefit from a strong coparenting relationship, why not do more to 
discourage divorce and heal marriages?  Why not try, given the “marriage-
go-round”—that those who divorce often remarry or repartner, leading to 
children experiencing one or more family transitions with new adults in the 
household and attendant instability?119 
What might Huntington say about the more extensive vision of family 
repair offered in the recent Institute for American Values report, Second 
Chances: A Proposal to Reduce Unnecessary Divorce, coauthored by 
William J. Doherty, a family studies scholar and experienced family 
therapist, and Leah Ward Sears, former chief justice of the Georgia Supreme 
Court?120  The authors counter the premise that divorce “happens only after 
 
116. Id. at 156–57. 
117. Id. at 157. 
118. See generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY 
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 148 (2000) 
(“[R]esearch suggests that marriage is a dynamic relationship; even the unhappiest of couples who 
grimly stick it out for the sake of the children can find happiness together a few years down the 
road.”). 
119. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND 10–11 (2009) (arguing that 
conflicting American cultural ideals about marriage lead to a cycle of marriage, divorce, and 
remarriage that results in a less stable home environment and worse outcomes for children). 
120. WILLIAM J. DOHERTY & LEAH WARD SEARS, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, SECOND CHANCES: 
A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE UNNECESSARY DIVORCE (2011), available at http://american 
values.org/catalog/pdfs/second-chances.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5L54-LHA4. 
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a long process of misery and conflict.”121  Instead, research finds that “[m]ost 
divorced couples report average happiness and low levels of conflict in their 
marriages,”122 such that “divorces with the greatest potential to harm children 
occur in marriages that have the greatest potential for reconciliation.”123  
Filling a gap in research, Doherty and his colleagues asked nearly 2,500 
divorcing parents, after they had taken their required parenting classes, “if 
they would be interested in exploring marital reconciliation with professional 
help.”124  The study found that “[a]bout one in four individual parents 
indicated some belief . . . that their marriage could still be saved, and in about 
one in nine couples both partners did.”125  If a “significant minority” of 
individuals and couples “expressed interest in learning more about 
reconciliation” that far into the divorce process, Doherty and Sears suggest, 
then “the proportion of couples open to reconciliation might be even higher 
at the outset of the divorce process—before the process itself has caused 
additional strife.”126  For example, another study by Doherty and colleagues 
found that “about one-third of married people who had ever reported low 
marital happiness later on experienced a turnaround.”127 
Doherty and Sears propose that states adopt a one-year waiting period 
for divorce, and, if the couple has children, they must complete a marriage-
dissolution program before filing for divorce.128  That program must include, 
along with “information on constructive parenting in the dissolution process” 
and skills to “increase cooperation and diminish conflict” and information on 
alternatives to litigation, “information on the option of reconciliation” and 
resources to assist interested couples with reconciliation.129  With such 
measures, family law could return to an earlier (but short-lived) focus by 
family court professionals on reconciliation.130  This type of education seems 
consistent with Huntington’s emphasis on repair.  After all, as Huntington 
mentions, the original vision of no-fault divorce was therapeutic:131 people in 
 
121. Id. at 10. 
122. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (citing Paul R. Amato & Bryndl Holmann-Marriott, A 
Comparison of High- and Low-Distress Marriages that End in Divorce, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
621 (2007)). 
123. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alan Booth & Paul R. Amato, Parental Predivorce 
Relations and Offspring Postdivorce Well-Being, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 197, 211 (2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
124. Id. at 15–16 (emphasis omitted) (citing William J. Doherty et al., Interest in Marital 
Reconciliation Among Divorcing Parents, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 313, 313–14 (2011)). 
125. Id. at 16. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 17, 19 (discussing Jared R. Anderson, Mark J. Van Ryzin & William J. Doherty, 
Developmental Trajectories of Marital Happiness in Continuously Married Individuals: A Group-
Based Modeling Approach, 24 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 587 (2010)). 
128. Id. at 20, 33–34. 
129. Id. at 46–47. 
130. Id. at 15. 
131. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 274 n.119. 
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“dead” marriages should be able to end them without having to allege fault, 
and courts and helping professions should focus their energies on saving 
marriages that could be saved.132  Isn’t Huntington’s advocacy of a cycle of 
intimacy all the more reason to prevent divorce, when possible, by helping 
people save—repair—their marriages, particularly when they have children?  
What might Huntington think of another measure proposed by Doherty and 
Sears, an Early Notification and Divorce Prevention Letter, which would start 
the clock running on the one-year waiting period, while informing the other 
spouse that the marriage “has serious problems” that may lead to separation 
and divorce; stating that the sender wants the marriage “to survive and 
flourish”; and asking whether the other spouse is willing to work on the 
problems in the marriage with appropriate professional help, “save” the 
marriage, and make it healthy?133 
Of course, there is an important gender dimension to this prescription: 
women initiate the majority of unilateral divorces.134  One reason is that 
women’s happiness, health, and other benefits from marriage are more 
sensitive to marriage quality.135  There is also a class dimension, since, as one 
marriage movement document reports, “more educated and affluent 
Americans are now markedly more likely to succeed in marriage than their 
less privileged fellow citizens.”136 
C. Limits to What Government Can Do: Enlisting Civil Society and 
Public–Private Partnerships 
Familiar slogans in family-values rhetoric, particularly in presidential 
speeches of recent decades, are that government doesn’t raise children, 
parents do, and should; government can’t love and nurture.137  Another 
slogan—that there are problems that government alone can’t solve138—has 
 
132. J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF 
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 118 (1997). 
133. DOHERTY & SEARS, supra note 120, at 29 (emphasis added). 
134. Id. at 22–23. 
135. MARGARET F. BRINIG, FAMILY, LAW, AND COMMUNITY: SUPPORTING THE COVENANT 
60, 69 (2010); FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 109, at 100; INST. FOR AM. VALUES & NAT’L 
MARRIAGE PROJECT, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: THIRTY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 31–32 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS]; MCCLAIN, supra note 61, 
at 134–35. 
136. WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS, supra note 135, at 16. 
137. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7456, 3 C.F.R. 255 (July 21, 2001) (“Government cannot 
replace the love and nurturing of committed parents that are essential for a child’s well-being.”); 
President George H.W. Bush, Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican 
National Convention (Aug. 20, 1992) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
/ws/?pid=21352), archived at http://perma.cc/75FJ-VFQC (“[W]hen it comes to raising children, 
Government doesn’t know best; parents know best.”). 
138. See Governor William J. Clinton, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the 
Democratic National Convention (July 16, 1992) (transcript available at http://www.presidency 
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translated into intense interest in public–private partnerships in recent 
decades.  It is a puzzle why Huntington does not situate her vision of family 
flourishing in the context of these trends, explaining points of continuity and 
discontinuity.  For example, she clarifies that she is not arguing that “the state 
can and should do everything.”139  Rather: “Other entities and institutions 
play a significant role in helping families flourish.  For example, faith 
communities, informal support networks, and community groups play 
essential roles in nurturing strong, stable, positive relationships.”140  She 
offers a positive example of the nonprofit organization KaBOOM! becoming 
a partner with communities to build playgrounds.141  Noting that the United 
States has a long history of “this kind of community effort,” she argues that 
“[t]he most important role for the state in this context is to support, not 
supplant, this civic engagement.”142 
Huntington’s brief statement that government should “support, not 
supplant” echoes a prominent theme in numerous calls to enlist civil society 
and public–private partnerships to build social capital, strengthen families 
and communities, and deliver goods and services.143  For example, the 
responsive community and civil society movements called for the use of 
public–private partnerships to empower vulnerable communities and 
cautioned that government should support rather than replace social 
subsystems.144  Huntington’s vision also resonates with the idea of 
subsidiarity—“that the smallest possible unit should . . . address a problem 
and a larger unit should step in to provide aid only if that smaller unit 
otherwise would fail”145—an inspiration for President George W. Bush’s 
faith-based initiative.146  President Bill Clinton insisted that there are certain 
tasks that government simply cannot do, or certainly cannot do as well as 
nongovernmental actors.147  Drawing on Bronfenbrenner, Hillary Clinton—
 
.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25958), archived at http://perma.cc/7ZV3-ZCTR (“There is not a program in 
government for every problem . . . .”). 
139. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 220. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 220–21. 
142. Id. at 221. 
143. See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 109, at 104–06 (arguing that “[c]ivil society should 
support democratic self-government, not supplant it”); Linda C. McClain, Unleashing or 
Harnessing “Armies of Compassion”?: Reflections on the Faith-Based Initiative, 39 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 361, 368–69 (2008) (describing President George W. Bush’s “faith-based initiative” as calling 
for a more coordinated national effort to enlist public–private partnerships to meet social needs in 
America’s communities). 
144. FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 109, at 104–06. 
145. Id. at 105.  Some family law and child welfare scholars also appeal to this principle.  See 
generally Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reframing the Legal 
Framework to Capture the Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 247 (2011). 
146. See McClain, supra note 143, at 366–67 (describing how proponents of faith-based 
initatives appeal to subsidiarity). 
147. Clinton, supra note 138. 
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Sawhill’s prime example of a “village builder”148—called for an “ecological 
or environmental approach” or “child in the village model” that looked at all 
the different ways civil society and government could support the well-being 
of children.149 
By now, the call for enlisting civil society in public–private partnerships 
has transformed the federal government itself, which has an Office of Faith-
Based and Neighborhood Partnerships that coordinates with related “centers” 
in a number of federal agencies.150  If the pervasive state should “support” 
civic engagement in ways that contribute to families’ positive relationships 
and “foster pluralism . . . by supporting a variety of different nonprofit 
institutions,”151 then some evaluation of government’s actual deployment to 
date of these partnerships and funding of various nongovernmental 
organizations would be instructive. 
D. A New Baseline for Argument About Family Forms? 
Back in the 1990s, at the height of the “family values” wars, many 
feminist and left/liberal family scholars and commentators warned about 
appeals to a social science “consensus” about either family form or family 
values and the risks of generalizations.152  They wrote books in defense of 
single-parent families and against constructing single mothers as 
pathological or deviant.153  Sociologists and journalists offered fine-grained 
empirical accounts of the lives of single mothers in America and why they 
 
148. SAWHILL, GENERATION UNBOUND, supra note 24, at 87. 
149. CLINTON, supra note 67, at 314–15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150. About the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, OFF. FAITH-BASED & 
NEIGHBORHOOD P’SHIPS, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/about, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NTK8-YXMG. 
151. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 221. 
152. See, e.g., Judith Stacey, The Father Fixation, UTNE READER, Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 72, 72 
[hereinafter Stacey, Father Fixation], available at http://www.utne.com/politics/fretting-about-
fatherlessness-american-nuclear-family.aspx#axzz3MHP4DG5e, archived at http://perma.cc/RJ32-
TFJJ (“As a sociologist, I can attest that there is absolutely no consensus among social scientists on 
family values, on the superiority of the heterosexual nuclear family, or on the supposed evil effects 
of fatherlessness.”); Judith Stacey, The New Family Values Crusaders, NATION, July 25–Aug. 1, 
1994, at 119, 119–22 (criticizing arguments on family values claimed to be based on social science 
consensus). 
153. See, e.g., NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES xi–xix (1997) 
(recounting her own decision to become a single parent and calling for a shift from stigmatizing to 
supporting single-parent families); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 21–24, 101–06 (1995) (arguing 
that the dominant patriarchal ideology constructs “family” around heterosexual monogamous 
marriage, rendering as “deviant” mothers outside of that family form); DOROTHY ROBERTS, 
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 217–25 
(1997) (challenging the “conservative vision” of single mothers, particularly of black, single 
mothers, as immoral and harmful and critiquing “myths about welfare and reproduction” that drove 
punitive welfare reform in the 1990s). 
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separated motherhood from marriage.154  Family historians and social 
scientists countered the rhetoric of the crisis of “fatherless America” as 
harming children and driving America’s most urgent social problems155 with 
positive accounts of family diversity and calls for more inclusive social 
values reflecting support and respect for diverse families.156 
Failure to Flourish signals a new baseline for and tenor of conversation 
about family form.  To be sure, Huntington embraces values of diversity and 
pluralism and an “ecumenical” approach to family form, which does not 
insist on the marital family as the normative model.157  Nonetheless, her book 
contains many passages about the advantages and better outcomes for 
children of a stable, marital, biological, two-parent family and the 
disadvantages and worse outcomes experienced by children in single parent 
and “complex family structures” that could readily be found in position 
papers and calls to action by many traditionalists groups concerned with 
shoring up marriage and intact, two-parent families for the sake of child well-
being158—statements to which feminist and left-of-center scholars and 
advocates reacted.159  For example, she asserts: “As much as liberals might 
 
154. See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS 
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 16–19 (1997) (exploring the issues faced by unskilled 
single mothers earning wages below the poverty line); MELISSA LUDTKE, ON OUR OWN: 
UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD IN AMERICA xi–xii (1997) (using the author’s personal experiences as 
a single mother as an entry into examining the experiences of unmarried teen mothers and older, 
unwed mothers).  Although the book was not published until 2005, the findings of Kathryn Edin’s 
coauthored book with Maria Kefalas, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT 
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005), influenced later welfare-reauthorization debates.  See 
MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 143–44 (noting Edin’s congressional testimony). 
155. DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT 
SOCIAL PROBLEM 1 (1995). 
156. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH 
AMERICA’S CHANGING FAMILIES 3, 9 (1997) (breaking down negative misconceptions about family 
diversity); Stacey, Father Fixation, supra note 152, at 73 (arguing that “family diversity is here to 
stay” and pointing to evidence of positive outcomes for children reared by gay and lesbian parents). 
157. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xix (“Accordingly, this book addresses relationships 
that go beyond the traditional nuclear family of a married mother and father living with their 
biological or adopted children.”). 
158. Compare id. at 31–34 (canvassing the “overwhelming evidence that children raised by 
single or cohabiting parents have worse outcomes than children raised by married, biological 
parents”), with THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 108, at 10–11 (summarizing social science 
research that “children do better, on average, when they are raised by their own two married parents” 
and that children raised in single-parent households are more likely to have a range of negative 
outcomes). 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 152–56.  Among those reactions, I include my own 
earlier criticism of the marriage movement and governmental marriage promotion: 
The marriage movement’s repeated references to a “consensus” on the benefits of 
marriage and the harms of nonmarital family forms may illustrate a “feedback loop”: 
a group of social scientists cite repeatedly to each other’s work so that a certain set of 
claims is presented as an “uncontested” consensus, even if there is credible social 
science to the contrary. 
MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 128. 
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wish otherwise, there is mounting evidence that family structure is a causal 
factor, among others, affecting child outcomes.”160  Another striking parallel 
to earlier discourse about strengthening families is her frequent warnings that 
society will either “pay now or pay later” to help families and that “we are 
already paying for the costs associated with poorly functioning families.”161 
Once again, the intersection of the two sides of the marriage equality 
issue (highlighted by the Seventh Circuit oral argument) is notable.  
Huntington concludes: “[T]here is ample evidence that, with the exception of 
families headed by same-sex couples, children raised by two married, 
biological parents have better outcomes than children raised in other family 
structures.”162  Thus, as same-sex couples challenging state restrictions on 
marriage argue, and as judges conclude, there is a robust consensus that 
quality of parenting, not gender, is what matters for child outcomes.163  And 
those couples do not attempt to dethrone marriage as the primary social 
institution for rearing children.  To the contrary, taking a cue from Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, they argue that their children suffer harm, humiliation, 
and stigma where their parents’ relationship is not dignified as a marriage.164  
 
160. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 204. 
161. Id. at xvii.  On the appeal to “costs” in this earlier discourse, see Linda C. McClain, 
“Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 360 (1996) (“In the rhetoric of irresponsible 
reproduction, one charge common to all three targets described above—single mothers, welfare 
mothers, and teen mothers—is that such family forms are costly for children, for society, and for 
men’s roles as fathers.”). 
162. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 35 (emphasis added). 
163. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (favorably quoting 
testimony that “quality of parenting” rather than “gender” is the key), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-574); id. at 771 (“[T]he 
overwhelming weight of the scientific evidence supports the ‘no differences’ viewpoint.”).  In 
reversing the federal district court, the Sixth Circuit majority opinion accepted the responsible 
procreation rationale as satisfying rational basis review for constitutionality, while observing that 
evidence (such as that presented at trial) about the capacity of “gay couples” to raise children 
supported the “policy argument” for extending marriage laws to such couples.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388, 404–08 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-
574).  By contrast, the dissent quoted Baskin’s sharp critique of the responsible procreation rationale 
as “so full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously.”  Id. at 430 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The dissent 
also concluded that the extensive trial record about child outcomes supported the district court’s 
determination that “the amendment [barring marriage by same-sex couples and marriage 
recognition] is in no way related to the asserted state interest in ensuring an optimal environment 
for child-rearing.”  Id. at 424–27. 
164. Specifically, Justice Kennedy’s Windsor majority opinion.  United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“[The Defense of Marriage Act] humiliates tens of thousands of children 
now being raised by same-sex couples.”); see also Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14-CV-00089-TMB, 
2014 WL 5089399, at *2 (D. Alaska Oct. 12, 2014) (“The Plaintiffs argue that the laws’ effect 
stigmatizes same-sex couples and their children by relegating them to a ‘second class status’ . . . .”).  
Illustrative is a complaint filed shortly after Windsor, which cited the crucial language from Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion.  First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 10, 
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (No. 1:13-CV-1861).  As the Complaint 
alleges: 
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And a nearly unbroken stream of federal courts agree, including Judge 
Posner, as discussed above. 
Will this exaltation of marriage for same-sex couples who are parents 
create a “new illegitimacy” for other pathways to parenthood and forms of 
family life?165  Will the availability of marriage for same-sex couples lead to 
even more emphasis on the importance of two-parent families? 
What is the new consensus about family form that should guide a 
flourishing family law?  Might it end the “war over the family”?  What is the 
place of marriage in that new consensus?  Huntington emphasizes 
encouraging “long-term commitment” between parents in coparenting 
relationships, not encouraging marriage per se.166  Marriage equality 
discourse emphasizes the wrongful exclusion of same-sex couples from “the 
common vocabulary of family life and belonging that other[s] [] may take for 
granted,”167 a rhetoric that affirms rather than challenges the favored place of 
marriage as a setting for adult commitment and child rearing.  As the Ninth 
Circuit recently put it, stressing the role of marriage not only in bringing, but 
in keeping, a couple together: “Raising children is hard; marriage supports 
same-sex couples in parenting their children, just as it does opposite-sex 
couples.”168 
In a significant turning point in the war over the family, David 
Blankenhorn, president of the Institute of American Values and a prominent 
leader of the marriage movement who publicly announced he now supported 
same-sex marriage, has joined with journalist and same-sex marriage 
proponent Jonathan Rauch to call for a “new conversation” about 
strengthening marriage that supports marriage for same-sex couples and a 
marriage opportunity agenda to address the growing marriage divide.169  Is 
this a sound way to help foster strong, stable, and positive relationships that 
Huntington could support?  Or is policy analyst Isabel Sawhill, a veteran of 
 
[Plaintiffs] and their children are stigmatized and relegated to a second class status by 
being barred from marriage.  The exclusion ‘tells [same-sex] couples and all the world 
that their relationships are unworthy’ of recognition. [Windsor] at 2694.  And it 
‘humiliates the . . . children now being raised by same-sex couples’ . . . .  Id. 
Id. 
165. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 387, 389 (2012). 
166. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 177 (“Deciding that the state should encourage a long-
term commitment between parents does not necessarily mean that the state should focus only on 
marriage.”). 
167. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *3 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 7, 2014) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Governor Otter’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014) (No. 1:13-
cv-00482-CWD)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
168. Id. at *6. 
169. Inst. for Am. Values, A Call for a New Conversation on Marriage, PROPOSITIONS, Winter 
2013, at 1, 2–5, available at http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/2013-01.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6EZF-BH5E. 
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the 1990s welfare and “family values” debates and a leader in efforts to end 
teen and unplanned pregnancy, correct that the “genie is out of the bottle” 
with respect to the separation of marriage and parenthood, so that, rather than 
seeking to restore marriage as “the standard way to raise children,” the aim 
should be “a new ethic of responsible parenthood”?170  Naomi Cahn and June 
Carbone have also called for a “responsible parenthood” model, although 
they have observed that when people follow that model of investing in 
education and avoiding early pregnancy and parenthood, they tend to have 
children within marriage.171  
If it is a fool’s errand to try to reconnect marriage and parenthood 
because both limited economic prospects and changed social norms are at 
work (which government programs have not done much to alter), then 
perhaps the focus should be on the front end, or prevention: facilitating 
greater access to the most effective and much better contraception and 
instilling an ethic that means “not having a child before you and your partner 
really want one and have thought about how you will care for that child.”172  
Or, as Blankenhorn counters, perhaps it is too soon to give up on marriage—
which, rather than “disappearing, [is] fracturing along class lines”—and it 
may be more realistic to try to promote a responsible parenthood ethic with 
the assistance of the social institution of marriage than as simply a matter of 
individual responsibility?173  Why not pair, Rauch argues, Sawhill’s emphasis 
on effective contraception with improving access to marriage and 
strengthening a marriage culture?174 
A valuable role that Failure to Flourish may play in this new landscape 
is to invite a holistic look at family formation and parenthood and the aims 
of a flourishing family law.  The argument, made in marriage equality 
litigation, that marriage channels all those casual heterosexual relationships 
that result in accidental pregnancy and childbearing into stable, marital 
families is a fantasy not, as Posner observed, borne out in reality.175  
Nonetheless, the underlying social problem of unstable family circumstances 
that impact child well-being is real and warrants attention. 
 
170. Sawhill, Beyond Marriage, supra note 24. 
171. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 170–89 (2010) (discussing the benefits of 
improved sex education and contraception access). 
172. Sawhill, Beyond Marriage, supra note 24. 
173. David Blankenhorn, Don’t Give Up on Marriage Now, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 10, 2014, 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/865612822/Dont-give-up-on-marriage-now.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/C2B5-S4A3. 
174. Jonathan Rauch, Don’t Give Up on Marriage Yet, SOC. MOBILITY MEMOS, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Oct. 16, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos 
/posts/2014/10/16-dont-give-up-on-marriage-rauch, archived at http://perma.cc/8L8L-35PG.  For 
Huntington’s qualified support for Sawhill’s approach, see Huntington, supra note 54. 
175. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
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Huntington, like some other family law and feminist scholars, seeks to 
attend more to the plight of unmarried fathers and to encourage stable and 
positive coparenting relationships without necessarily aiming at marriage.176  
The vivid ethnographic stories of the lives and worldviews of the low-income 
fathers profiled by Kathryn Edin and Timothy J. Nelson in Doing the Best I 
Can: Fatherhood in the Inner City are inspiring such work.177   
Given this concern over low-income fathers, it would be useful to know 
what lessons, if any, Huntington thinks that a flourishing family law might 
glean from the intense focus since the 1990s on using welfare funds as a tool 
to strengthen families by promoting “responsible fatherhood” as “integral to 
successful child rearing and the well-being of children.”178 
Those efforts target father absence and articulate the premise that a 
healthy start for a child requires the nurture and support of both parents.  Just 
as Huntington urges that fathers matter for more than economic 
contributions, one recent White House report by the Obama Administration 
defined responsible fatherhood as “actively contributing to a child’s healthy 
development, sharing economic responsibilities, and cooperating with a 
child’s mother in addressing the full range of a child’s and family’s needs.”179  
The George W. Bush Administration similarly declared that fathers have 
“emotional” as well as “financial commitments” and that “[d]ads play 
indispensable roles that cannot be measured in dollars and cents: nurturer, 
mentor, disciplinarian, moral instructor, and skills coach, among other 
roles.”180  Huntington acknowledges (in a footnote) that funding for healthy 
marriage and responsible fatherhood traces back to the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005.181  However, there is a much longer history of governmental and 
 
176. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xiv–xv, 190–92; see also Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men 
as Fathers: The Courts, the Law, and Father-Absence in Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 511, 513 (2013) (offering an inventory of the “barriers to father-presence for nonresident low-
income court-involved men” and proposing ways the legal system could address those barriers).  An 
earlier work attending to low-income fathers and supporting a model of fatherhood focused more 
on active parenting than financial support is NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD (2000). 
177. KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE 
INNER CITY (2013).  On the influence of this book, see, for example, HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, 
at 190–92 (discussing the dynamic in nonmarital relationships); Kohn, supra note 176, at 522–23 
(discussing the “light” the book sheds on relationships between unmarried parents).  Nancy Dowd, 
who has long championed redefining fatherhood around caretaking rather than breadwinning, also 
finds Edin and Nelson’s book inspiring in terms of fathers’ engagement with their children.  
Remarks at Workshop on Theorizing the State at Emory University School of Law (Dec. 6, 2014). 
178. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31025, FATHERHOOD 
INITIATIVES: CONNECTING FATHERS TO THEIR CHILDREN 1 (2014) (quoting Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. § 101 
(1996) (enacted)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179. OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 2 (2012). 
180. SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 178, at 2 (quoting EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A 
BLUEPRINT FOR NEW BEGINNINGS: A RESPONSIBLE BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S PRIORITIES 75 
(2001)). 
181. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 292 n.32. 
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nongovernmental efforts, at various levels, to encourage responsible 
fatherhood, and it would be useful to consider whether any lessons or best 
practices emerge from that experience.182  For example, her call to focus not 
on marriage but on stable coparenting relationships has important precedents 
in debates about how best to encourage responsible fatherhood: through 
promoting marriage as the proper site of such fatherhood or through 
“strengthening families as they exist,” including addressing education and 
economic barriers to healthy relationships, which will benefit adults and 
children even if such efforts do not lead to marriage.183  This latter approach, 
which focused more on capacity building, resonates with Huntington’s and 
certainly makes sense given what she calls challenges facing the “complex 
family structures” of families formed by unmarried parents.184 
Underlying this issue, however, are questions of class and power.  In 
Marriage Markets: How Inequality is Remaking the American Family, June 
Carbone and Naomi Cahn observe that part of what has made marriages 
“healthier” at the top of the income spectrum is the fact that high-income men 
outnumber the high-income women the men view as desirable partners.185  
This creates a better relationship market for the most successful women while 
the men, who invest more time and money in their children than the fathers 
of a half century ago, also enjoy greater rights at divorce, including shared 
parenting.186  The combination of the two encourages marriage, deters 
divorce, and promotes family stability. 
Carbone and Cahn argue that, in contrast, women find men without jobs 
to be poor candidates for marriage; in communities in which the women 
greatly outnumber the men who make good partners, relationship quality, 
married or unmarried, suffers.187  The women, who increasingly outearn the 
men and still do more for the children, gain greater relationship power the 
more that they control access to children.188  Carbone and Cahn object that 
most of the efforts to promote paternal involvement come at the expense of 
 
182. See McClain, supra note 161, at 389 & n.209 (observing the emergence of “a new ‘social 
movement’ . . . calling for ‘responsible fatherhood’ and diagnosing ‘fatherlessness’ as a central, if 
not the ‘most urgent,’ social problem driving an array of other social ills” and listing associated 
organizations, including the National Fatherhood Initiative, National Institute for Responsible 
Fatherhood, Family Revitalization, and Promise Keepers). 
183. MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 141 (quoting Ronald Mincy, What About Black Fathers?, 
AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 7, 2002, http://prospect.org/article/what-about-black-fathers, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5LQJ-YFGF) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
184. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xviii. 
185. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING 
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 62–63 (2014). 
186. Id. at 118. 
187. See id. at 72–73 (summarizing sociological research that shows a decline in relationship 
quality among unmarried couples when male-to-female ratios fall). 
188. See id. at 130–31 (finding that an unmarried father’s “continuing relationship with his 
children depends on how he manages the relationship with the mother” and the mother’s 
“willingness to allow access” depends on economic and noneconomic factors). 
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women’s hard fought autonomy.189  “Repairing” relationships is unlikely to 
work in the face of a mismatch between men and women. 
E. Marriage Education: Worth a Second Look? 
Like Huntington and some other family law and feminist scholars, I 
have been skeptical about governmental promotion of marriage and 
responsible fatherhood, particularly given some of the gender role 
assumptions of marriage and fatherhood agendas and (until recently) the 
exclusion of same-sex couples.190  When the federal government dedicated 
funds to marriage promotion, I argued that “[f]acilitating the relationship 
decisions of persons considering marriage, and teaching them skills that may 
contribute to a successful marriage, differs from trying to persuade persons 
not seeking to marry to do so.”191  
Nonetheless, if one takes to heart Failure to Flourish’s call for a more 
preventive family law that does more at the front end to promote strong, 
stable, and positive relationships, perhaps efforts at relationship education 
and marriage education deserve another look as a means of helping both 
adult–adult and parent–child relationships.  In 2006, the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 2005 opened up dedicated streams of funding for such efforts.192  By 
now, many states have marriage commissions and initiatives and produce 
educational materials, and the federal government funds a National Healthy 
Marriage Resource Center.193  The marriage movement also championed 
such education, both through the efforts of faith communities and through 
government subsidies, as a way to improve marital quality and reduce 
divorce.194 
A basic premise of such education is that the skills and knowledge 
necessary for a healthy relationship can be taught and that, as a Florida 
booklet for marrying couples puts it: “Once relationship skills are learned, 
they are generalized to parenting, the workplace, schools, neighborhoods, 
and civic relationships.”195  Pertinent to Huntington’s proposed focus on the 
cycle of intimacy, which recognizes the inevitability of conflict, these 
materials typically stress that all relationships have conflicts; how people 
 
189. Id. at 133. 
190. MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 117–19. 
191. Id. at 130. 
192. See supra note 181. 
193. NAT’L HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org/ 
index.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3CJJ-6PRP. 
194. THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 108, at 20–23. 
195. FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE FLA. BAR, FAMILY LAW HANDBOOK 1, available at 
http://www.flclerks.com/PDF/2000_2001_pdfs/7-99_VERSION_Family_Law_Handbook.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/G9ZW-S2MR; see also Diane Sollee, Where Are We Going?, in 
MARRIAGE: JUST A PIECE OF PAPER? 372, 376, 381 (Katherine Anderson et al. eds., 2002) (urging 
that we think of marriage as a “skill-based relationship” and that a “skills set” can help people to 
keep marriages together). 
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handle conflict in a relationship distinguishes healthy from unhealthy 
relationships.196  At first, some of these materials were laughable (whether or 
not intentionally so),197 but by now states are producing booklets written by 
respected experts in sociology, family studies, and family and marriage 
education and counseling.198  Indeed, Carbone and Cahn conclude that 
“effective” marriage education that “encourage[s] students to look for the 
warning signs of domestic violence, learn how to keep the lines of 
communication open, and insist on mutual respect” might contribute to 
“relationship stability.”199  It would be instructive to see how Huntington 
might grade these materials measured against her vision for what the 
“pervasive” state should be doing.  Are these materials overly intrusive on a 
couple’s relationship, which is none of government’s business?  Or simply 
ineffectual?  Or might they be, as one of my married Family Law students 
put it, “pure gold,” when it comes to preparing young people for the 
challenges of married life? 
IV. Dispute-Resolution Family Law: Islands in a Sea of Dysfunction or a 
Velvet Revolution? 
Failure to Flourish views dispute-resolution family law as 
fundamentally negative.  This is a baffling diagnosis at least with respect to 
the family dissolution process where divorcing parents have minor children.  
Huntington argues that dispute-resolution family law uses an inapt adversary 
model, does little to repair relationships to foster coparenting, and that 
lawyers practicing family law are particularly destructive of relationships.200  
Far more persuasive is Jana Singer’s observation that “[o]ver the past two 
decades, there has been a paradigm shift in the way the legal system handles 
most family disputes—particularly disputes involving children”—from a 
“law-oriented and judge-focused adversary model” to a “more collaborative, 
interdisciplinary, and forward-looking family dispute resolution regime.”201   
 
196. See, e.g., Sollee, supra note 195, at 377 (“The most important skill set is how to handle 
disagreement, since all couples fight.”). 
197. My personal favorite is a video, The Marriage News You Can Use, in which the fictional 
news station C-Wed featured reporters giving marriage advice.  Video tape: The Marriage News 
You Can Use (Utah Department of Workforce Services 2002) (on file with author). 
198. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT, LA. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., MARRIAGE 
MATTERS!: A GUIDE FOR LOUISIANA COUPLES, available at http://www.dss.state.la.us/assets/docs 
/searchable/OFS/GuideMarriageChild/MarriageMatters.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RU5F-3T 
KP.  Theodora Ooms was the senior consultant on the project that produced MARRIAGE MATTERS!, 
and the coauthors were Ooms, Scott Stanley, Paul Amato, and Barbara Markey.  Id. at 2. 
199. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 185, at 180. 
200. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 83–88. 
201. Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a 
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009). 
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Singer identifies several “related components” of this paradigm shift, or 
what she calls a “velvet revolution.”202  Some of those components feature in 
Huntington’s book as exemplary of the direction in which Huntington would 
like dispute-resolution family law to move.203  Family law scholars and 
practitioners are likely to view these components as far enough established 
as to be institutionalized rather than “a few narrow reforms.”204 
Huntington acknowledges (in a footnote) that Singer argues that these 
reforms “are more comprehensive”205 but does not explain why she implicitly 
resists Singer’s evaluation.  Some of the changes that Singer details, such as 
the shift to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), reflect trends that began 
forty or fifty years ago.206  Pertinent to Huntington’s concerns about post-
dissolution cooperative parenting, at the Pound Conference—a “defining 
event” in the ADR movement held in April 1976—participants stressed 
mediation as “better for litigants who had continuing relationships after the 
trial was over because it emphasized their common interests rather than those 
that divided them.”207  Other developments in this paradigm shift, such as 
court-affiliated parent education programs, date back to the 1990s and have 
taken hold more strongly since then.208  Singer also makes the intriguing 
observation that changes in substantive family law toward this new paradigm 
have facilitated changes in that direction in dispute-resolution family law and 
vice versa.209  Directly relevant to Huntington’s focus on the negative impact 
of both types of family law on children, Singer argues that the shift from the 
sole-custody paradigm to an “unmediated best-interests” of the child standard 
has facilitated a shift “from adversarial to nonadversarial resolution of 
divorce-related parenting disputes,” even as “the shift from adversarial to 
nonadversarial dispute resolution” has affected the legal norms governing 
custody cases, with a shift from custody judgments to parenting plans.210 
It is illuminating—and illustrative of the perceived link between strong, 
healthy families and a strong nation—that nearly all of the elements Singer 
 
202. Id.  For elaboration of these components, see infra notes 215–48 and accompanying text. 
203. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at xvi (listing several reforms that embody principles 
advocated by Huntington, including laws allowing joint custody, the “widespread use of mediation,” 
and that “some lawyers already adopt a more conciliatory, cooperative approach to family 
conflicts”). 
204. Contra id. (arguing that these “few narrow reforms” are still “haphazard, unconnected, 
and sometimes actively challenged”). 
205. Id. at 276 n.135. 
206. See ANDREW L. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 50 (2004). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 68–69. 
209. Jana B. Singer, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close 
Connection Between Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related Parenting Disputes, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177–78 (2014). 
210. Id. 
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identifies as part of the paradigm shift featured in the recommendations for a 
“family-friendly court” made in a 1996 report by the U.S. Commission on 
Child and Family Welfare, Parenting Our Children: In the Best Interests of 
the Nation.211  The report recommends, for example, changing the 
nomenclature away from custody and visitation to language of parenting time 
and responsibility, requiring parents to draft parenting plans, involving 
mediation in contested custody cases, requiring parent education, and 
improving access to the courts for unmarried parents.212  Notably, similar to 
Huntington’s call for an assessment of the impact of law on relationships, the 
Commission recommends: “Governments at all levels should evaluate laws 
and policies with respect to their effects on families.”213  The report also 
offers many recommendations about the vital role of communities in 
empowering families, both with respect to family formation, parenting, and 
mentoring, as well as to “support the development and public awareness of 
effective community-based, non-court, dispute resolution, and family 
support programs that can help family members resolve disputes and address 
the consequences of divorce.”214 
Many of the reforms recommended in Parenting Our Children are now 
part of the paradigm shift Singer detects in family law.  First is “a profound 
skepticism about the value of traditional adversary procedures” as “ill suited 
for resolving disputes involving children.”215  Influenced by social science 
findings about the critical role parents’ behavior during and after separation 
plays on children’s adjustment, “academics and court reformers have argued 
that family courts should abandon the adversary paradigm in favor of 
approaches that help parents manage their conflict and encourage them to 
develop positive postdivorce coparenting relationships.”216  Moreover, 
family courts have “embraced this insight” by adopting “an array of 
nonadversary dispute resolution mechanisms designed to avoid adjudication 
of family cases.”217 
The paradigm shift is also evident in the practice of family lawyers, who, 
in increasing numbers, have “rejected the adversary paradigm, in favor of a 
collaborative law model.”218  In the early 1990s, for example, the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) adopted standards of conduct 
for divorce lawyers, Bounds of Advocacy,219 out of a conviction that there 
 
211. U.S. COMM’N ON CHILD & FAMILY WELFARE, PARENTING OUR CHILDREN: IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE NATION 3–5 (1996) [hereinafter PARENTING OUR CHILDREN]. 
212. Id. at 29–43. 
213. Id. at 62. 
214. Id. at 52–56. 
215. Singer, supra note 201, at 363. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 364. 
218. Id. 
219. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (1991). 
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was a tension between the zealous advocacy required by existing professional 
responsibility rules and the realities of divorce practice and that competent 
representation could include a problem-solving approach mindful of the 
client’s children and family.220  The aspirational guidelines the AAML 
adopted are very much in keeping with Huntington’s vision.  They recognize 
that divorce presents human and emotional problems as well as legal 
problems and recommend that attorneys advise their clients about the 
economic and emotional impact of divorce and explore “the possibility or 
advisability of reconciliation.”221 
Recognizing that a cooperative resolution of matrimonial disputes is 
“desirable,” an attorney should consider ADR methods;222 and, if 
representing a parent, “should consider the welfare of, and seek to minimize 
the adverse impact of the divorce, on minor children.”223  In Divorce Lawyers 
at Work, Lynn Mather and her colleagues found that divorce attorneys 
understand advocacy by reference to a model of the “reasonable lawyer,” 
which, although it differs by community of practice, generally finds the 
zealous advocacy model inapt for family law disputes.224  Their research 
confirms prior work finding that “divorce lawyers dampen legal conflict far 
more than they exacerbate it and generally try to avoid adversarial actions.”225  
By contrast, Huntington relies on one study finding “that family-law 
practitioners are far more likely to engage in relationship-destroying, 
adversarial behavior than lawyers in any other type of practice.”226  That 
study, however, is problematic both for its small sample size and ambiguity 
about how it defined family lawyers.227  Huntington’s critique of family 
lawyers misses the significance of context.  If a family lawyer in a high-stakes 
divorce, with lots of assets or contested custody and lots of resources with 
which to wage battle, faces an opponent with a winner-take-all or zero-sum 
mentality or is negotiating with a very aggressive opponent, then that lawyer 
 
220. LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK 113 (2001). 
221. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, supra note 219, R. 2.12. 
222. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 
223. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY R. 6.1 (2000). 
224. MATHER ET AL., supra note 220, at 111. 
225. Id. at 114. 
226. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 88. 
227. E-mail from Lynn Mather, Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School, to author (Sept. 20, 
2014, 12:28 EST) (on file with author).  Lynn Mather reviewed the 2006 study on which Huntington 
relies, Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are Really Doing When 
They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612 (2006), and observed certain weaknesses in the study.  First, 
the sample sizes are too small; out of 578 attorneys surveyed, only 10.6% (or 61) were “family 
lawyers,” and only 14.8% (or 9) of those family lawyers were “unethically adverse.”  Id. at 616 
tbl.4; see also E-mail from Lynn Mather, supra.  Second, the study does not indicate clearly how it 
defines family lawyers, so that generalist lawyers handling family law cases, who are more likely 
to get caught up in the emotions of their client and behave adversarially, may be skewing the results.  
E-mail from Lynn Mather, supra.  
MCCLAIN.TOPRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:04 PM 
2015] Is There a Way Forward? 737 
will “play the game,” but it may not be the game the lawyer prefers.228  Apart 
from such high-stakes cases, family lawyers practice mindful of the fact that 
the parties will be dealing with each other on an ongoing basis concerning 
children.229 
The second element, Singer observes, is “the belief that most family 
disputes are not discrete legal events, but ongoing social and emotional 
processes.”230  When family disputes are thus “recharacterized,” they “call 
not for zealous legal approaches, but for interventions that are collaborative, 
holistic, and interdisciplinary because these are the types of interventions 
most likely to address the families [sic] underlying dysfunction and 
emotional needs.”231 
The third element in the paradigm shift is a “reformulation of the goal 
of legal intervention in the family” from a “backward-looking process, 
designed primarily to assign blame and allocate rights” to a paradigm in 
which a judge “assume[s] the forward-looking task of supervising a process 
of family reorganization.”232  Indeed, family law teachers readily will 
recognize that the goal of family “reorganization” is pervasive in discussions 
of the tasks that legal and nonlegal professionals face in helping “families in 
transition,” including preparing divorcing or never-married parents for 
coparenting.233  The slogan, “‘parents are forever, even if marriages are 
not,’”234 captures this idea and stands in sharp contrast to the “clean break” 
idea that informs other aspects of divorce.235  This forward-looking, 
reorganizing approach applies not only to divorcing couples with children 
but also to never married parents.  This development seems particularly 
resonant with Huntington’s call for a flourishing state to help foster strong, 
stable, and positive relationships and to repair relationships so that they can 
help parents to coparent and children to flourish.  Therapeutic jurisprudence 
(a movement praised by Huntington) “embodies this forward-looking 
 
228. MATHER ET AL., supra note 220, at 128–30 (describing how family lawyers may prefer a 
cooperative negotiation style, but instead adopt an adversarial style in response to an adversarial 
opponent). 
229. Lynn Mather & Craig A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The 
Challenges of Divorce Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN 
CONTEXT 63, 79 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (finding that many family law 
specialists “held strong views, consistent with the AAML, that the interests of children should 
temper zealous advocacy on behalf of a client”). 
230. Singer, supra note 201, at 364. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. See, e.g., Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., IAALS’ Honoring Families Initiative: Courts and 
Communities Helping Families in Transition Arising from Separation or Divorce, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 
351, 353, 370 (2013) (explaining the risks involved during transitional times when families are 
reorganizing after separation or divorce). 
234. SCHEPARD, supra note 206, at 45 & 193 n.149 (quoting a sign on a wall of a Los Angeles 
mediation program office). 
235. Singer, supra note 201, at 366. 
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orientation” so that “legal intervention in the family strives not merely to 
resolve disputes, but to improve the material and psychological well-being of 
individuals and families in conflict.”236 
The fourth element follows from the third: “[T]o achieve these 
therapeutic goals, family courts have adopted systems that deemphasize 
third-party dispute resolution in favor of capacity-building processes that 
seek to empower families to resolve their own conflicts.”237  This focus on 
capacity building seems akin to Huntington’s argument, in the child-welfare 
context, to focus on the strengths that families have and to empower them to 
solve their problems.238 
Many developments in family law and family courts illustrate this 
emphasis on helping family members resolve their own conflicts in a way 
that will foster child well-being and reduce hostility between parents.  These 
programs may not explicitly use the language of “repairing” relationships but 
seem in keeping with a flourishing family law’s aim of facilitating 
cooperative coparenting relationships between people who are no longer 
intimate partners.  It is puzzling that, although Huntington acknowledges that 
some of these programs exist, her book does not suggest the extent to which 
these programs are not simply islands of reform but institutionalized as a new 
approach to family conflict. 
Consider parent education programs.  A recent inventory of parent 
education in the family courts dated the “first documented parent education 
programs” to the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the first court-mandated 
program in 1986.239  Parent education programs “proliferated rapidly in the 
1990s”; by 1998, a national survey reported “that 44 states had state or local 
laws authorizing courts to require attendance at a program.”240  Today, with 
such programs “operating in 46 states” and popular with courts and users, 
parent education is institutionalized and part of the present-day landscape of 
dispute-resolution family law.241 
A primary reason for requiring parent education plans is to ameliorate 
the effects of parental conflict on children.242  Parenting Our Children, for 
example, quoted Judith Wallerstein: “Conflict can destroy . . . [.]  What 
protects the child is a civil, rational, responsible relationship between [the] 
 
236. Id. at 364. 
237. Id. 
238. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 131–37 (describing family group conferences as premised 
on the principle that “families have strengths and are capable of changing the problems in their 
lives”). 
239. Peter Salem et al., Taking Stock of Parent Education in the Family Courts: Envisioning a 
Public Health Approach, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 131, 132 (2013). 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 133. 
242. Id. at 135. 
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parents and realistic planning that is sensitive to the [needs of the] growing 
child.”243 
The pervasiveness of parent education programs does not, admittedly, 
guarantee that such programs actually are lessening parental conflict or 
fostering healthy relationships.244  Some literature on parent education 
explicitly embraces a public health or ecological model, speaking of the role 
parent education can play in changing some of the most important risk and 
protective factors for children from divorce, since high levels of parental 
conflict and a “poor co-parenting relationship” are among those factors.245  
The focus on educating parents about risk and protective factors suggests an 
ecological approach. 
Finally, the “fifth component of the paradigm shift is an increased 
emphasis on predispute planning and preventive law.”246  This component 
seems particularly in keeping with Huntington’s critique of family law for 
being too focused on the back end, when a family is in crisis, rather than on 
preventative and facilitative measures.247  Parenting plans, long proposed by 
the AAML and more recently by the American Law Institute, have this 
future-directed, dispute-prevention focus, including “a mechanism for 
periodic review or a process for resolving future disagreements” by means, 
ideally, that do not involve court intervention.248 
Related developments in family law that Huntington views more as a 
hopeful sign than as a significant shift are the move away from the language 
of custody and visitation to the language of parenting responsibility and 
parenting time and the shift from the sole custody model to shared 
parenting.249  Proponents of such changes argued that the changes would 
“have a positive impact on parental cooperation and the well-being of 
children.”250 
As Singer notes, this paradigm shift brings with it some concerns and 
challenges relevant to Huntington’s reparative model.  Consider shared 
parenting.  Context and class matter in assessing the place and impact of this 
norm in family law.  Carbone and Cahn argue that what they call the “upper 
third,” married, college-educated parents, follow a new marital script in 
which “[m]en are expected to play a larger role in their children’s lives, and 
while women are freer to leave unhappy relationships, they no longer control 
access to the child in the process of doing so,” given the legal regime favoring 
 
243. PARENTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 211, at 32 (quoting Judith Wallerstein). 
244. Salem et al., supra note 239, at 135–36. 
245. Id. at 139–40. 
246. Singer, supra note 201, at 365. 
247. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
248. Id. at 364–65. 
249. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 124–26, 130–31. 
250. PARENTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 211, at 30. 
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shared parenting.251  But what of unmarried parents or parents in an unstable 
marriage?  Feminist readers of Huntington might fear that in a world of 
flourishing family law, a pervasive state encouraging coparenting will, in 
effect, force mothers who do not want to deal with the biological fathers of 
their children to deal with them as legal coparents and will not yield much by 
way of positive benefits to the children, while limiting such women’s ability 
to choose a man who has taken responsibility for the child to be the legal 
father.252 
Another concern is whether, in the case of children born to young people 
who “drift” into parenthood and lack a stable relationship, the goal of 
cementing a long-term, coparenting relationship is realistic.  Huntington 
herself acknowledges that factors like “family instability and multipartner 
fertility make it harder for parents and children to maintain strong, stable, 
positive relationships.”253  Selectivity in picking “the right partner” 
contributes, Cahn and Carbone argue, to relationship stability; what can the 
“pervasive state” do to address the problem that “many intimate relationships 
today are characterized by ‘quick entrees, partners gathering little evidence 
about trustworthiness, limited interdependence, and an emphasis on partners 
meeting specific immediate needs’”?254  Is “parallel parenting,” in which 
parents each rear a child in appropriate ways and do not undermine each 
other, rather than a model of parents actively communicating and sharing 
responsibility for major decisions, a better aim?255  Certainly, parallel 
parenting may lead to cooperative parenting, but it may not.256  But it is not 
clear “repair” is the operative concept. 
In sum, Singer seems to have the more persuasive argument that a 
paradigm shift has occurred.  Undeniably, there is a shortfall between the 
normative commitments to a new paradigm and practical realities on the 
ground.  On the one hand, many innovative programs are in place in family 
courts, in communities, and in family law practice that have moved from an 
adversarial paradigm to a problem-solving or collaborative model.  On the 
other hand, material constraints like budget cuts threaten such programs and 
overcrowded dockets also tax the court system.  Moreover, the rise of pro se 
representation means more people will not have legal representation.257  But 
that does not mean a new normative paradigm is needed. Huntington’s 
 
251. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 185, at 126–27. 
252. Id. at 136–40 (discussing approaches to the marital presumption and pointing out how 
some approaches control women and impinge on their decision-making authority). 
253. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 156. 
254. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 185, at 180 (quoting Linda M. Burton et al., The Role of 
Trust in Low-Income Mothers’ Intimate Unions, 71 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1107, 1122 (2009)). 
255. SCHEPARD, supra note 206, at 35–36, 101–02. 
256. Id. 
257. For a sobering account of the potential causes and impact of the rise in pro se 
representation, see Kourlis et al., supra note 233, at 357. 
MCCLAIN.TOPRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:04 PM 
2015] Is There a Way Forward? 741 
positive vision for flourishing family law fits more or less comfortably into 
shifts already under way.  As one scholar recently concluded, “the challenge 
fundamentally is one of translation” so that the benefits of the family law 
revolution are more widely available, particularly to the “high proportion” of 
participants in family court who lack an attorney or have “limited to modest 
resources.”258 
V. Conclusion 
In this Review, I have argued that it is a propitious time to consider 
whether there is a way forward in the war over the family.  I have situated 
Failure to Flourish within the context both of previous calls to strengthen 
families as well as two present-day conversations about marriage, family law, 
and equality that too often proceed parallel to, but independent of, each other.  
Through her invitation to focus on why family relationships matter and the 
conditions under which children in particular flourish, Huntington, a “village 
builder,” nonetheless finds some common ground with  “traditionalists.”  Her 
arguments about how to deploy the pervasive state—and family law—to 
foster flourishing relationships are a useful complement to other theories of 
the state, such as Fineman’s vulnerability theory, focused on the role of 
societal institutions in providing resources and building resilience and of the 
state in bringing into being and maintaining those institutions.259  Moving 
forward, both the relational and institutional focus are vital and, in a sense, 
are another way to think about the channeling function of law in creating and 
supporting social institutions that allow realization of important goods or 
ends.260  
I have disagreed with parts of Huntington’s critique of “negative” family 
law, countering that, at least with respect to dispute resolution family law in 
the context of family dissolution involving minor children, there is a 
concerted shift toward reducing “war” between family members to make 
peaceful legal proceedings and coparenting possible.  Nonetheless, in my 
view, most of her positive agenda, from (as Sawhill proposes) encouraging 
young people to delay childbearing and parenting until they are ready and 
capable, to supporting parents in their “critical work” of child development, 
to attending to the environments in which families live, is sound and 
unobjectionable.  It is similar to many progressive calls for a new family 
agenda.  I support a marriage plus agenda that declines to move completely 
 
258. Deborah Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 63, 64–65, 
96 (2012). 
259. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and 
Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND 
POLITICS 13, 20–26 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013). 
260. See id. at 25 (“The state is always at least a residual actor in the formation and functioning 
of society and should accept some responsibility in regard to the effects and operation of those 
institutions it brings into being and helps to maintain.”). 
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“beyond marriage” but instead supports marriage while nurturing other 
family and relationship forms.261  Perhaps Failure to Flourish will invite 
conversation about why, with so many decades of calls not just to talk about 
family values but to implement policies that “value families,” there is still 
such a shortfall and how it may be possible to better realize those values. 
 
261. See MCCLAIN, supra note 61, at 191–219 (arguing for a model that supports many 
different kinds of familial relationships). 
